July 8, 2026: Iran-backed Hezbollah Islamic terrorists have been using FOG/Fiber Optics Guided drones. Last month the FOG drones made several successful attacks on Israeli targets. The only countermeasure used by Israeli troops was electronic jamming, which doesn't work against fiber-optic drones controlled by a thin fiber-optic cable connecting the drone with its operator. There is a solution for this. A year ago, Russian FOG drones were being used by the Ukrainians to reveal where the Russian drone operators were. This was done with Ukrainian FPV/First Person View drones equipped with a sensor that tracked the movement of the Russian drone and where it was launched from by its hidden operator. The sensor led Ukrainian drones to the location where the operator was killed and any additional drones with him destroyed. One vital task for the Ukrainian drones was attacking Russian truck traffic near the front line. Ukrainian drones could destroy trucks operating within ten kilometers of the front. Without the trucks, Russian troops have to carry supplies or pull carts full of material to the front line. This was manageable. But then the Ukrainians introduced a larger drone with a range of 40 kilometers. That distance was prohibitive for Russian supply movement. In other words, the Ukrainians starved the Russians out.

Ukrainian drone developers, operating under wartime pressure, have been very innovative. This increased innovation began with new countermeasures to counter attacks by remotely controlled drone swarms. The usual Russian defense was jamming the control signals. The new Ukrainian swarms have drones capable of operating independently when jammed and continuing the attack with less accuracy, but because it is a swarm with dozens of drones, some were still going to hit the target. This was used against the Russians, but the enemy quickly came up with their own new countermeasures. This is a common cycle in modern drone warfare.